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Abstract 
The issue of climate change is now a familiar one. Most academics and other affiliated fields agree that climate 
change is or should become a mainstream issue. There is currently a lot of pressure on governments to take it 
seriously and legislate against actions that cause climate change. The extent to which this is in fact possible is 
currently debatable. Legal mechanisms are arguably at an embryonic stage. Therefore, it has become necessary to 
suggest the means in which loss and damage from climate change can be litigated in domestic courts and at the 
international level, knowing that the impact of climate change cuts through international boundaries. This issue 
can no longer be left to interstate diplomacy which has so far been unsuccessful in effectively tackling this 
matter. Litigating loss and damage against impacts caused by climate change therefore appears to be an attractive 
alternative and possible avenue to galvanizing greenhouse gas emitters to cut their emissions knowing that there 
may be some legal consequences if they renege on emission reduction targets.  However, because of the 
international dimension of climate change impacts, litigants may not find the route very smooth. To this end, this 
paper examines the possible barriers that may lie in wait for potential litigants. The paper also seeks to suggest 
possible ways of overcoming these barriers.  
Keywords: loss and damage; impact of climate change; litigation as alternative method;  
barriers to litigation; overcoming barriers to litigation. 
 
1.0.  Introduction  
Global climate change is having observable effects on the environment. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) forecasts a temperature rise of between 2.5 to 10 degrees Fahrenheit over the next century1 and 
according to them, human-induced climate change will transform the ecological balance of our planet and lead to 
dramatic societal problems. According to the most recent Synthesis report (Fifth Assessment Report) of the 
IPCC,2 “human influence on the climate system is clear and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases 
are the highest in history. This has led to atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous 
oxide that are unprecedented in at least the last 800,000 years.”  
Impacts of climate change include sea level rise and coastal zone flooding (as polar ice caps melt), 
widespread ecosystems and land use change, possible violent weather patterns, human health impacts. However, 
climate change, means much more than these as entire belts of arable land are likely to shift as climate patterns 
change permanently. Water sources, already strained, could dry up as the mountain glaciers that feed them 
themselves vanish. In human terms, this could mean famine, competition over remaining resources, and 
migration, either within countries or across national borders, creating environmental refugees. Settling 
environmental refugees3 is already a problem facing the international community, as inhabitants of Pacific Island 
states already threatened by rising sea levels are looking for alternative places to live without necessarily 
sacrificing their cultural identity. In turn, climate change may affect global public health as diseases move with 
climate changes: malaria, for instance, is already appearing in parts hitherto not prevalent.4 The unfortunate 
aspect of this scenario is that many countries, especially the developing countries, will bear more brunt of these 
effects. 
Based on these projections, it seems natural that the international society would be doing everything in 
                                                          
1
 NASA, “The Current and Future Consequences of Global Change”, (5 May 2015), available at 
http://climate.nasa.gov/effects/ (last assessed on April 25, 2015) 
2
 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “Climate Change 2014 Synthesis Report, Summary for Policymakers” 
available at  http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf (last assessed on June 20, 2015), 
2 
3
 The Darfur crisis is a case in point. 
4
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its power to combat climate change. Unfortunately, this is not the case. Due to the fact that the global economy 
relies so heavily on the burning of fossil fuels, the primary cause of climate change, thus, forming effective 
mechanisms to control and mitigate climate change is daunting. As a way out, recourse may be had to litigating 
loss and damage against perceived emitters of greenhouse gases (GHGs). But the pathway to this for a potential 
claimant is replete with thorns. 
 
2.0.  What obstacles are in wait for potential litigants 
Public international law largely overlaps with international politics, and governments often fundamentally 
disagree about what constitutes the relevant law in a particular case. In order to address problem issues on the 
international plane, governments tend to rely on a variety of political means. Climate policies potentially reach 
all activities that burn fossil fuels and thus, go to the heart of the economy of many countries. Also, the nature of 
the issue of climate change impact is such that it will require a very long-term response under conditions of 
scientific uncertainty, and in some cases scientific denials of human induced climate change. Therefore, 
governments are usually cautious about making commitments under international law to limit emission of GHGs 
and are sensitive to whether their trade competitors will commit to undertake comparable efforts. International 
courts and tribunals have also been very cautious in interpreting international obligations and forcing a particular 
conduct upon States and interfering in their domestic affairs. They are often perceived as another forum for 
international diplomacy and rarely issue hard hitting judgements. All these, and many more, have laid a number 
of obstacles in wait for a potential litigant in claims for loss and damage arising from climate change impacts. 
1). The first challenging obstacle that a victim of climate change impact may face is establishing 
causation against an emitter or group of emitters. As Hunter and Salzman1 noted, “climate change is essentially a 
global environmental tort and establishing causal links between climate change and alleged damages to the 
environment and the link between a party’s discrete greenhouse gas emissions and alleged damages is a thorny 
task.” For instance, coral reefs may face many other threats that contribute to their degradation besides 
attributing such degradation to impact of climate change. For example, degradation may be due to terrestrial 
runoff, disease and predators that may not have any causal relationship with pollution occasioned by emission of 
GHGs.  Thus, establishing links of this nature will require very expensive research which may stretch the 
resources of Small Island and vulnerable States.2 
Again, at the outset, there is a difficulty in actually identifying a relationship between an ascertained 
plaintiff (or class of plaintiffs) and an ascertained defendant (or class of defendants). This is because the class of 
defendants have a global and vast membership, including producers of fossil fuels, users of fossil fuels and 
manufacturers or marketers of products whose use contributes to climate change. In the same vein, identifying 
the plaintiff would also be problematic. However, since climate change is liable to affect all of humanity to 
varying degrees, membership of the class of plaintiffs would include all of humanity. Thus, a potential litigant 
need not prove that he was affected by the impact of climate change, or that he suffered loss or damage over and 
above others, for him to qualify as a plaintiff. It should be noted that causation has two different elements:  
(a) Cause in fact, where plaintiffs must prove that but for the breach of duty, injury would not have 
occurred; and  
(b) Proximate causation or legal causation where the court determines whether the injury was 
sufficiently foreseeable to allow for the imposition of liability.  
On the first element of “cause in fact,” the traditional test requires the plaintiff to demonstrate on a 
balance of probabilities that, “but for” the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff would not have been harmed.3 With 
multiple actors emitting greenhouse gases over a century it is difficult to attribute specific causation for harms 
thousands of kilometres away to any particular industrial sector let alone specific corporate defendant. This is 
because the contribution of any one facility or identifiable group of emitters is fairly insignificant and thus will 
not be substantial enough for a court to find that “but for” its emissions the alleged harm would not have 
occurred. This is however changing. In the case of Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),4 
the EPA argued, in relation to causation, that its decision not to regulate emission of GHGs from new motor 
vehicles contributes so insignificantly to the petitioners’ injuries that it cannot be challenged in court. The 
Supreme Court held against the EPA stating that “its argument rests on the erroneous assumption that a small, 
incremental step, because it is incremental, can never be attacked in a federal judicial forum. Yet accepting that 
premise would doom most challenges to regulatory action.” 
The Canadian test of “material contribution” is the only significant departure from the traditional 
                                                          
1
 D. Hunter and J. Salzman: “Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate Change Litigation,” 155 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review (2007) 1741, at 1748 
2
 W. G. Burns: “Potential Causes of Action for Climate Change Damages in International Fora: The Law of the Sea 
Convention,” 2 International Journal of Sustainable Development and Policy, 27 (2006) p. 50 
3
 Snell v. Farrell, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 311 at para. 15.   
4
 Massachusetts v Environmental Protection Agency 549 US 497, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d. 248 (2007). 
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approach in recognition that the “but for” test. But this is unworkable in some circumstances.1 However, the 
Supreme Court of Canada has emphasized that the “but for” approach to causation should be presumptively 
applied in all but the most exceptional of cases. In this vein, in Resurfice Corp. v. Hanke,2 the Supreme Court of 
Canada stipulated that the “material contribution” test should only be applied when two requirements are met. 
First, it must be impossible for the plaintiff to prove that the defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury 
using the “but for” test. Second, it must be clear that the defendant breached a duty of care owed to the plaintiff, 
thereby exposing the plaintiff to an unreasonable risk of injury, and the plaintiff must have suffered that form of 
injury. It is also necessary to establish that there is a causal link between the activities complained of and the 
harm in question, posit Schwarte and Byrne.3  
The problem with damage from climate change is that due to the complex and synergetic effect of the 
diverse pollutants and polluters involved, and the non-linearity of climate change, it may be difficult to establish 
a chain of causation.4 Contributory factors may intervene, and the complexity of the climate system can almost 
always be relied upon to assert a possible break in the chain.  
Problems are also likely to arise in relation to reasonable foreseeability and proximity which is the 
second element. What risks are reasonably foreseeable and which plaintiffs are within the zone of foreseeable 
risk, one may be tempted to ask. Establishing the test may prove extremely hard. Is it reasonably foreseeable that 
a particular defendant’s conduct, such as emitting GHGs by using fossil fuels in the course of its business, could 
result in a specific climate change-induced event, such as greater tidal inundation that, in turn, harms a resident 
or his property in a coastal community? And when did such foreseeability arise?5 The international jurisprudence 
in this respect differs and the test applied has ranged from “clear and convincing” to “on the balance of 
probabilities.”6 The precautionary principle comes to the rescue in unravelling this log-jam. To this end, the 
principle has been used as a procedural tool to lower the standard of proof in situations where the complexity of 
scientific facts leads to a degree of uncertainty.7  
The core of the precautionary principle, which is still evolving, is reflected in Principle 15 of the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992. It provides that: 
Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for 
postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation. 
At the most general level, the principle means that states agree to act carefully and with foresight when taking 
decisions which concern activities that may have an adverse impact on the environment. A more focused 
interpretation provides that the principle requires activities and substances which may be harmful to the 
environment to be regulated, and possibly prohibited, even if no conclusive or overwhelming evidence is 
available as to the harm or likely harm they may cause to the environment. As the Bergen Ministerial 
Declaration on Sustainable Development, 1990 8 put it, “lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a 
reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation.” Under the Rio Declaration, the 
requirement is stated to be mandatory: lack of full scientific certainty ‘shall not be used’ to prevent action.9 
Under Article 4(3) (f) of the Bamako Convention, 1991,10 parties are required to strive to adopt and implement 
the preventive, precautionary approach to pollution which entails, inter alia:  
preventing the release into the environment of substances which 
may cause harm to humans or the environment without waiting 
for scientific proof the appropriate measures to implement the 
precautionary principle to pollution prevention through the 
                                                          
1
 Athey v. Leonati, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 458.  
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 2007 SCC 7 at para. 25 
3
 C. Schwarte and R. Byrne, “International climate change litigation and the negotiation process - Working paper”, (14 
October 2010) available at http://www.google.com/url?q=http://www.caneurope.org/resources/doc_view/1942-field-
international-climate-litigation-and-the-negotiation-process-oct-2010&sa=U&ei=1PBKVar1AcH-
UvangOAO&ved=0CA0QFjAA&usg=AFQjCNFpg_b4GNkQsucorxkyqwlO7VoX9A (last assessed on May 7, 2015). 
4
 Christina Voigt, ‘State Responsibility for Climate Change Damages’, Nordic Journal of International Law, 
Vol. 77 Nos. 1-2, 2008. 
5
 D. Hunter and J. Salzman, ibid,  1745 and 1769 
6
 Corfu Channel case (Merits) (United Kingdom v. Albania), ICJ Reports 1949 
7
 Urgenda Foundation c. s. v. The Kingdom of the Netherlands and Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment [2015] 
Case C/09/456689/HA ZA 13-1396. 
8The first international instrument to treat the principle as one of general application and linked to sustainable development 
9
 Principle 15, Rio Declaration, 1992 
10
 Bamako Convention on the Ban of Imports into Africa and the Control of Trans-Boundary Movement and 
Management of Hazardous Wastes, 1991. 
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application of clean production methods. 
The use of this principle in establishing causation is apt as approach to its interpretation tends to shift 
the burden of proof and requires the person who wishes to carry out an activity or who had carried out an activity 
to prove that such activity will not or did not cause harm to the environment, as the case may be. This 
interpretation would require polluters, and polluting States, to establish that their activities and the discharge of 
certain substances did not adversely or significantly affect the environment.  
The precautionary principle has been receiving widespread support by the international community in 
relation to a broad range of decisions and subject areas. The practice of international courts and tribunals, and of 
States appearing before them, sheds some light in this respect. The principle appears to have been raised first in 
1995 when New Zealand1  made a case at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning French nuclear 
testing. New Zealand relied extensively on the principle, which it described as ‘a very widely accepted and 
operative principle of international law’ and which shifted the burden onto France to prove that the proposed 
tests would not give rise to environmental damage. 2  Five ‘intervening’ states (Australia, Micronesia, the 
Marshall Islands, Samoa and the Solomon Islands) also invoked the principle. France responded that the status of 
the principle in international law was tout a fait incertain, but that in any event it had been complied with, and 
that evidentiary burdens were no different in the environmental field than any other area of international law.3 
The ICJ’s order did not refer to these arguments, although Judge Weeramantry’s dissent noted that the principle 
had ‘evolved to meet [the] evidentiary difficulty caused by the fact [that] information required to prove a 
proposition’ may be ‘in the hands of the party causing or threatening the damage’, and that it was ‘gaining 
increasing support as part of the international law of the environment.’4  
In the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros case,5 Hungary and Slovakia also invoked the precautionary principle. 
Again, the ICJ did not feel the need to address the principle, limiting itself to a passing reference to Hungary’s 
claim that the principle justified the termination of the 1977 treaty and its recognition of the parties’ agreement 
on the need to take environmental concerns seriously and to take the required precautionary measures.  
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) had also been presented with arguments 
invoking the principle, and has shown itself to be notably more open to its  application, albeit, without express 
reliance. In 1999, in the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases,6 Australia and New Zealand requested the Tribunal to 
order ‘that the parties act consistently with the precautionary principle in fishing for Southern Bluefin Tuna 
pending a final settlement of the dispute.’ Japan, the respondent State, did not address the question of the status 
or effect of the principle. In its Order the Tribunal expressed the view that the parties should “act with prudence 
and caution to ensure that effective conservation measures are taken to prevent serious harm to the stock of 
southern bluefin tuna.”7 The Court further stated: 
that there was ‘scientific uncertainty regarding measures to be 
taken to conserve the stock of southern bluefun tuna, and that, 
although it could not conclusively asses the scientific evidence 
presented by the parties, measures should be taken as a matter of 
urgency to preserve the rights of the parties and to avert further 
deterioration of the southern bluefin tuna stock.8 
In 2001, in the MOX case,9 Ireland claimed that the United Kingdom had failed to apply a precautionary 
approach to the protection of the Irish Sea in the exercise of its decision-making authority in relation to the direct 
and indirect consequences of the operation of the MOX plant and international movements of radioactive 
materials associated with the operation of the MOX plant. The principle was invoked by Ireland at the 
provisional measures phase to support its claim that the United Kingdom had the burden of demonstrating that 
no harm would arise from discharges and other consequences of the operation of the MOX plant, and to inform 
the assessment by the Tribunal of the urgency of the measures it is required to take in respect of the operation of 
the MOX plant. For its part, and while accepting that in assessing the level of risk in any given case 
considerations of prudence and caution may be relevant, the United Kingdom argued that in the absence of the 
evidence showing a real risk of harm precaution could not warrant a restraint of the rights of the United 
Kingdom to operate a plant. The Tribunal did not order the suspension of the operation of the plant, as Ireland 
had requested, but instead ordered the parties to co-operate and enter into consultations to exchange further 
                                                          
1
 Nuclear Testing cases ICJ CR/95/20 at 20-1 
2
 Supra 
3
 Supra, at 78 
4
 Supra, at 79 
5(1997) ICJ Reports 7 at 78, paragraph 140. 
6
 Australia and New Zealand v. Japan 39 ILM 1359 (2000) 
7(1997) ICJ Reports 7 at 83, paragraph 77 
8
 Supra, paragraph  80 
9
 Ireland v. UK, ITLOS Order of 3th December, 2001. 
International Affairs and Global Strategy                                                                                                                                          www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-574X (Paper)  ISSN 2224-8951 (Online) 
Vol.44, 2016 
 
66 
information on possible consequences for the Irish Sea arising out of the commissioning of the marine 
environment which might result from the operation of the MOX plant. That Order, which has a certain 
precautionary character, was premised on considerations of prudence and caution. 
The principle had also been addressed by the World Trade Organization (WTO) Appellate Body. In 
1998, in the Beef Hormones case,1 the European Community invoked the principle to justify its claim that it was 
entitled to prohibit imports of beef produced in the United States and Canada with artificial hormones, where the 
impacts on human health were uncertain. The Community argued that the principle was already ‘a general 
customary rule of international law or at least a general principle of law.’ It also maintained that the principle 
applies to both the assessment and management of a risk. The Community based this argument that the principle 
informed the meaning and effect of Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the WTO’s Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary 
Measures (the ‘SPS Agreement’). The United States denied that the principle represented a principle of 
customary international law, and preferred to characterize it as an ‘approach’ the content of which may vary 
from context to context.2 Canada on the other hand referred to the principle as ‘an emerging principle of 
international law, which may in the future crystallize into one of the “general principles of law recognized by 
civilized nations”, within the meaning of Article 38(1) (c) of the ICJ Statute.3 The WTO Appellate Body agreed 
with the United States and Canada that the precautionary principle did not override Articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the 
SPS Agreement, although it considered that it was reflected in the preamble to and Articles 3.3 and 5.7 of the 
SPS Agreement, which did not exhaust the relevance of the principle. Recognizing that the status of the principle 
in international law was the subject of continued debate, and that it was regarded by some as having crystallized 
into a general principle of customary international environmental law, the Appellate Body said: 
Whether it has been widely accepted by Members as a principle of 
general of customary International law appears less than clear. We 
consider, however, that it is unnecessary, and probably imprudent, 
for the Appellate Body in this appeal to take a position on this 
important, but abstract, question. We note that the Panel itself did 
not make any definitive finding with regard to the status of the 
precautionary principle in international law and that the 
precautionary principle, at least outside the field of international 
environmental law, still awaits authoritative formulation.4 
The principle was again raised before regional courts, such as the European Court of Human Rights. In Balmer-
Schafroth v. Switzerland,5 the applicants claimed that the failure of Switzerland to provide for administrative 
review of a decision extending the operation of a nuclear facility violated Article 6 of the European Convention 
on Human rights. The claim was rejected by the majority, because the connection between the government’s 
decision and the applicants’ right was too remote and tenuous. The Court ruled that they had failed to  
establish a direct link between the operating conditions of the 
power station … and their right to protection of their 
physical integrity, as they failed to show that the operation  of 
Muhleberg power station exposed them personally to a danger 
that was not only serious but also specific and, above all, 
imminent. In the absence of such a finding, the effect on the 
population of the measures which the Federal Council could have 
ordered to be taken in the instant case therefore remained 
hypothetical. Consequently, neither the dangers nor the remedies 
were established with a degree of probability that made the 
outcome of the proceedings directly decisive.6 
A dissenting opinion by seven judges, however, criticized this finding, on the grounds that it ‘ignored 
the whole trend of international institutions and public international law towards protecting persons and heritage, 
as evident (inter alia) in … the development of the precautionary principle.’7  
At the national level, several decisions had arisen in addressing the status of the precautionary principle 
under international law. In Vellore8 case for example, the Indian Supreme Court ruled that the precautionary 
                                                          
1
 Report of the WTO Appellate Body, 16th January, 1998, www.eu.org/env, accessed  May 29,  2015 
2
 Report of the WTO Appellate Body,ibid  
3
 Report of the WTO Appellate Body, op cit 
4
 Beef Hormones case, paragraph 123 
5
 (1998) 25 EHRR 598 
6
 Balmer-Schafroth v. Switzerland, paragraph 40 
7
 Supra, paragraph 45. 
8
 Vellore Citizens’ Welfare Forum v. Union of India and Others,     
www.narmanda.org/sardarsarovar/sc.ruling/majority.judgment.doc, accessed 05/06/2015. 
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principle was an essential feature of ‘sustainable development’ and as such part of customary international law. 
By contrast, a United States Federal Court in the case of Beanal v. Freeport-Mcmoran,1 appears more restrained 
in its approach, holding that the principle was not yet established in customary international law so as to give rise 
to a cause of action under the Allen Tort Claims Statute. 
From the above one thing is clear, the legal status of the precautionary principle is evolving. There is 
certainly sufficient evidence of state practice to support the conclusion that the principle, as elaborated in 
Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration and various international conventions, has now received sufficiently broad 
support to allow a strong argument to be made that it reflects a principle of customary international law and 
could be used as a sword against a defendant in climate change induced calims. For as Ambassador Robert van 
Lierop, Permanent Representative2 to the UN of Vanuatu (Alliance of Small Island States, a group of low-lying 
states), in support of the principle pointed out: 
the precautionary principle is more than a semantic or theoretical 
exercise. It is an ecological and moral imperative. We do not have 
the luxury of waiting for conclusive proof, as some have 
suggested in the past. The proof, we fear, will kill us. 
We believe that in no distant time this dream may be achieved as climate change litigation is gaining 
currency globally. Moreover, in the existing jurisprudence, partial causation has also been considered sufficient 
to establish liability under international tort. This principle was long established in the Trail Smelter Arbitration3 
case. The case concerned a Canadian smelting company whose sulphur dioxide emissions had caused air 
pollution damages across the border in the United States of America (USA). The arbitral tribunal in that case 
determined that the government of Canada had to pay the United States compensation for damage that the 
smelter had caused primarily to land along the Columbia River valley in the USA. The tribunal concluded that 
there is an international principle that no State has the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a 
manner as to cause injury in or harm to the territory of another or the properties or persons therein, when the case 
is of serious consequence and the injury established by clear and convincing evidence.  
Arising from the above, reliance is then placed on the general rule under international law that supports 
the notion that States are jointly responsible for a wrongful act and are jointly and severally liable.4 Therefore, 
each State5 should be separately responsible for any act by it or GHG emitters within its territorial boundaries 
that contributed to climate change that resulted in any loss or damage. Perhaps, a look at Principle 21 of the 
Stockholm Declaration, 1972, now generally recognised as a basic norm of customary international law, adds to 
the quest that States be responsible for any act that caused damage outside its jurisdiction. The Principle posits 
that: 
states have in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to 
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental 
policies, and the responsibility to ensure that the activities within 
their jurisdiction or the control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other states or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.  
2). Another barrier to claims in climate change litigation is determining who the victim is. The jurisprudence of 
standing creates great uncertainty concerning the ability of environmental litigants to challenge climate change-
related activities. Victims of climate change impact can only present their claims before any judicial authority 
and have such claim entertained if they possess the requisite standing. Due to the dearth of supra-national cases 
on climate change, resort will be made to domestic decisions to properly discuss the concept of standing which is 
a barrier to instituting climate change litigation via international as well domestic avenues. 
Locus standi is a Latin word, which means, “a place of standing; standing in court; a right of appearance in a 
justice or before a legislative body on a given question.”6 Reduced to its bare bones, it means standing to sue. 
The fundamental aspect of locus standi is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before the 
                                                          
1
 969 F Supp 362 at 384 ( US District Court for Eastern District of Louisana, 9 April, 1997. 
2
 Statement to the Plenary Session of the INC/FCCC, 5th February, 1991 at 3, www.un.org, accessed 25th May, 2015. 
3
 Trail Smelter Arbitration: United States v Canada (1931–1941) 3 UNRIAA, vol. III 
4
 Article 139(2) United Nations Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
5
 For our purpose, State in this context means not only a country or nation with its own sovereign independent government, 
but also refers to the country's government and those government-controlled institutions that are responsible for its internal 
administration and its relationships with other countries. It also, by implication, includes all entities that operate within it, 
such as state-owned companies or any other company, which is registered under its Laws for the time being in force in that 
State. 
6
 H.C. Black: Black’s Law Dictionary 6th   (edn) (St. Paul Mina: West Printing Co, 1990)941 
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court and not on the issues he wished to have adjudicated.1 The concept of locus standi therefore concerns the 
capacity of a person to institute legal proceedings in a court of law or other competent tribunal. It follows that 
such person must have an interest which is sufficiently affected by the action.2 Thus, it is not enough that a 
person merely claims to fall within the class of persons for whose general interest that statute was passed. He 
must in addition show that he has some personal interest that has been, or is most likely or certain to be affected 
by the action complained.3 
The implication of questioning the locus standi of the plaintiff is to ascertain whether the plaintiff is the 
proper person to request adjudication of the issues and not whether the issues are justifiable.4 Locus standi 
therefore entails the legal capacity to institute, initiate or commence an action in a competent court of law or 
tribunal without any inhibition, obstruction or hindrance from any person or body whatsoever including the 
provisions of any existing law.5 According to a Nigerian court in the case of James Osadolor v. Honourable 
Minister FCT and others,6 for a plaintiff to have locus standi, the statement of claim must be seen to disclose a 
reasonable cause of action vested on the plaintiff, and an established legal rights and obligation or interest of the 
plaintiff which has been or about to be violated. To this end, a court is willing to allow any individual, or group 
of individuals, gain entry into its sanctuary, if he has sufficient interests to warrant the attention of the court. 
In determining whether a person has standing or not, a court in Nigeria in the case of Elendu v. Ekwoaba7 set out 
the following factors that may serve as guidelines: 
i For a person to have locus standi in an action, he must be able to show that his civil rights and 
obligations have been or are in danger of being infringed. 
ii The fact that a person may not succeed in an action does not have anything to do with whether or not he 
has a standing to sue. 
iii Whether a person’s civil rights and obligations have been affected, depends on the particular facts of the 
case. 
iv The court should not give an unduly restrictive interpretation to the expression locus standi. 
In furtherance to the above, the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended (the Nigerian 
Constitution) has vested in the courts with the powers to determine any question as to civil rights and obligations 
between government or authority and any person in Nigeria.8 What this means is that the provisions have 
removed the obstacles erected by locus standi which is common law requirement against individuals bringing 
actions before the court against government and its institutions,9 and by extension, against government agencies 
charged with environmental protection and also emitters of GHGs. To this end, section 6(6)(b) of the Nigerian 
Constitution gives a litigant, especially in environmental matters, the necessary standing to institute an action 
against environmental violators even if he has not been affected personally as environmental problems may 
likely have a deleterious effect on the environment in general. 
The observations of Oputa JSC, in the case of. A.G. of Kaduna State v Hassan,10 is worthy of note. According to 
him: 
There is perhaps no question more fundamental in the whole 
process of adjudication than that of access to justice, access to the 
courts. He who cannot even reach the court cannot talk of justice 
from these courts. It is in this context and for the fundamental 
reason that many legal systems are now relaxing the erstwhile 
severity of their rules governing locus standi. 
Where numerous individuals are harmed, many jurisdictions allow class actions to be filed by one or 
more members of the group or class of persons who have suffered a similar injury or have a similar cause of 
action. For instance, in the case of Urgenda Foundation c. s. v The Kingdom of the Netherlands,11 Urgenda and 
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Nine Hundred (900) others were allowed to institute an action against the Netherlands. The main demand of 
Urgenda and co. was that the Dutch state is acting unlawfully by not contributing its proportional share to 
preventing a global warming of more than 2 degrees Celsius. They sought from the court, an order that the Dutch 
State drastically, and no later than 2020, reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions coming from within the 
boundaries of the Netherlands, to the level that has been determined by scientists to be in line with less than 2 
degrees Celsius of global warming. The district court in The Hague granted the plaintiffs’ claims, and the 
government is now required to take more effective climate action to reduce the Netherlands’ considerable share 
in global emissions of CO2.  
Also, environmental statutes and regulations allowing citizen suits, either against an administrator for 
failure to perform a required act or against a person who is allegedly in violation of an environmental regulation, 
have served to enlarge the standing of citizens who seek redress through the courts.  
The status of standing to sue is expanding in other jurisdictions, even in the US where Article III of the 
U.S. Constitution limits the authority of Federal courts to hear only “cases or controversies.” Although Article III 
itself does not define a case or controversy, the Supreme Court has interpreted Article III as requiring plaintiffs 
to show they have a genuine interest and stake in a case by demonstrating they have standing to sue.1 According 
to the court in the case of Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC),2 to satisfy Article 
III’s standing requirement, a plaintiff must show: 
(a) ‘an injury in fact’ that is:  
i. concrete and particularized and  
ii. actual or imminent and not conjectural or hypothetical;  
(b) that the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant; and  
(c) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favourable decision. 
The issue of standing in relation to climate change litigation reared up in the US in the case of Massachusetts 
and ors v Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).3 In that case the State of Massachusetts, together with 11 
other States, three cities, two United States territories and several environmental groups sought review of the 
denial by EPA of a petition to regulate the emissions of four GHGs, including carbon dioxide, under s. 202 (a)(1) 
of the Clean Air Act, 1990. When litigation commenced, the EPA, inter alia, challenged the petitioners’ 
standing. The Court upheld the position that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the EPA’s denial of its 
rule-making petition. On appeal to the US Supreme Court, the Court applied the three-part test for standing 
enunciated in the case of Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife,4 that is, that: 
(a) The plaintiff has suffered “an injury in fact” which is both concrete and 
particularised, and actual and imminent, as opposed to conjectural or hypothetical. 
(b) The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant. 
(c) There is a likelihood that the injury can be redressed by a favourable decision, as 
opposed to this being merely speculation. 
The Court then held that Massachusetts had suffered an injury in fact as owner of the State’s coastal 
land which is and will be affected by climate change-induced sea level rise and coastal storms. The fact that 
other States suffered similar injuries did not disqualify Massachusetts. 
However, under international law, it is difficult to establish standing for climate change cases. Although 
a broader construction of standing is developing in the international legal process, decisions are still largely 
based on promoting the interests of the state party.5 The US which is the worst emitter has not submitted itself to 
the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ and on this note, the ICJ can barely assume jurisdiction in any suit brought 
against the US before it. Equally problematic is the fact that the ICJ has never condemned a country for 
damaging the environment and this may cause in the future, a dimension that is at the core of climate change 
litigation.6 
If we are to achieve an enduring environmental protection our position however is that any person or 
organizations by virtue of living or carrying out activities within a well- defined confines of a particular locality 
should be deemed to have sufficient interest to institute actions against any environmental violations that 
impacted on his person or property or his environment.  This is premised on the dictum of Lord Diplock who in 
the case of R v. Inland Revenue Commissioner. Exparte National Federal of Self-employed and Small Businesses 
Ltd,7 maintained that there would be a grave lacuna in our legal system of law if we needlessly adhere to locus 
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standi. To this he posits: 
If a pressure group or even a single public-spirited taxpayer were 
prevented by outdated technical rules of locus standi from 
bringing the matter to the attention of the court to vindicate the 
rule of law and get the unlawful conduct stopped.  
What is therefore being advocated is that in order to overcome the burden of standing to sue the courts 
should encourage public interest litigation or citizens’ suit.1 Public interest litigation can be initiated by any 
public spirited person who may feel the wrongful act being complained of affected him or others. Action may 
also be initiated by a voluntary organization or association which has dedicated itself to work for the protection 
of the rights of the people in particular locality. Courts in some jurisdictions appear to be amenable to the 
preposition of public litigation and have opened their doors to citizen to enforce laws and treaties signed by a 
State. In Shela Zia and Others v. WAPDA, PLD,2 the Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the right to a clean 
environment is a fundamental right of all citizens of Pakistan covered by the right to life and the right to dignity 
in Articles 6 and 14 of the Pakistani Constitution of 1973. The judgement clarified that public interest litigation 
could be brought without the necessary rule of standing to sue or of being directly affected as an “aggrieved 
person.”  
In  Juan Antonio Oposa and ors v. the Honourable Fulgecio Factoran and Anor,3  a class action was 
brought on behalf of group of Filipino minors through their parents under Philippine Ecological Network Inc, 
claiming that as citizens and tax payers they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural 
resource treasure that is the county’s rain forest and therefore prayed the court for an order directing the 
Secretary to the Department of Environmental and Nature Resources to cancel all existing timber license 
agreements and cease from accepting or approving new agreements. Although the court of first instance 
dismissed the action based on locus standi and the political question, on appeal to the Supreme Court of 
Philippines held that the plaintiffs had the right to sue on behalf of succeeding generations because every 
generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve the rhythm and harmony of nature for the full enjoyment of 
a balanced and healthful ecology.4 
To this end, as Rt.Hon.Justice A.T.M.Afzal, the Chief Justice of Bangladesh, pointed out “citizens suits 
must be encouraged as the role of the judiciary can be undermined if vigilant civil society does not play the role 
of watch dog.5  
What is being advocated is not an illusion. At international level Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration 
provides as follows: 
Environmental issues are best handled with the participation of all 
concerned citizens, at the relevant level. At the national level, 
each individual shall have appropriate access to information 
concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, 
including information on hazardous materials and activities in 
their communities, and the opportunity to participate in decision-
making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public 
awareness and participation by making information widely 
available. Effective access to judicial and administrative 
proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.6 
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Again, at regional level, the African Charter on Human and People’s Right in Article 24 provides that 
“all peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favourable to their development.” Even at 
the national level, many States’ Constitutions have given environment protection a stronger human rights focus. 
For instance, Section 20 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, as amended, provides for 
“the protection and improvement of the environment and safeguarding the water, air and land, forest and wildlife 
in Nigeria.” Article 45 of the Spanish Constitution declares that everyone has “the right to enjoy an environment 
suitable for the development of the person…” Article 5 of the Brazilian Constitution provides that “any citizen is 
a legitimate party to file a people's legal action with a view to nullifying an act injurious to the public property or 
to the property of an entity in which the State participates, to the administrative morality, to the environment and 
to the historic and cultural heritage….” It further in Article 225 declares that “everyone has the right to an 
ecologically balanced environment which is an asset of common use and essential to a healthy quality of life, and 
both the Government and the community shall have the duty to defend and preserve it for present and future 
generations.” In the same vein, Article 42 of the Russian Constitution, 1993, confers on everyone “the right to a 
favourable environment, reliable information about its condition and to compensation for the damage caused to 
his or her health or property by ecological violations.” All these provisions are veritable legal instruments to be 
used in suits against environmental damage under public interest litigation. 
To this effect, any individual or body can use the public interest litigation to institute a claim on climate 
change as it violates environmental rights. Where a Constitution includes a right to a clean and healthy 
environment, courts have often allowed public interest litigation. In Antonio Horvath Kisy Otros v. National 
Commission for the Environment 1 the Supreme Court of Chile granted standing to citizens not directly affected 
because it found that the constitutional right to a healthy environment does not impose a requirement that the 
affected people themselves present the action.2 The inclusion of environmental rights in the South African 
constitution has expanded standing.3 
3). A potential claimant will also need to tackle the issue of subject matter jurisdiction when making a claim. The 
most promising court for a potential claimant may not be able to adjudicate the case because the subject matter 
that is being brought is not one that it can properly determine within its jurisdiction. The litigant will need to 
ensure that the court in which it is seeking its remedy is one that is properly able to handle the dispute.  So far, 
the US courts by virtue of the Alien Torts Claim Statute are able to determine cases where US corporations and 
government officials have violated treaties and customary international law. This avenue for redress has been 
somewhat effective given that it has produced successful awards in the litigation of international human rights 
abuses and could quite possible produce similar results in climate change litigation. 
4). Even where a litigant was able to establishing causation against an emitter or group of emitters and showed 
that he has a standing to sue, he still needs to establishing the duty and standard of care owed to him by the 
emitters. When considering duty of care, Hunter and Salzman4 opined that this focus helps us to look beyond a 
sector-wide approach to defendants--for example, all utilities, oil and gas producers, or automobile 
manufacturers--to a focus on those companies within a sector that are lagging behind the industry leaders in 
responding to climate change. The question in climate change litigation is how wide the duty of care net will be 
cast; how big the zone of foreseeable risk is and importantly, the standard of care every individual has to another. 
Though it can be argued that the defendants in global environmental tort cases owe a duty of care to all people in 
the world but the real questions are: What is the standard or level of such duty of care? Is it strict standard of 
care?  
The court in Urgenda Foundation v. Kingdom of the Netherlands5 ordered the Dutch state to limit annual 
greenhouse gas emissions from the country to 25% below 1990 levels by 2020. The government had pledged a 
17% reduction, but the court found that insufficient. The court concluded that due to the severity of the 
consequences of climate change and the great risk of hazardous climate change occurring, the State has a duty of 
care to take mitigation measures. To the court, the 17% reduction promised by the country was not enough to 
mitigate climate change. It undertook a detailed examination of reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on 
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Climate Change, the United Nations Environment Programme, and various Dutch institutions, and concluded 
that the mandated 25% reduction was the level needed to meet the country's fair contribution toward the United 
Nation’s goal of keeping global temperature increases within two degrees Celsius of pre-industrial conditions. 
While the UNCLOS establishes an obligation on the part of its parties to “protect and preserve the 
marine environment,” this does not impose an absolute prohibition against pollution. Rather, this provision has 
been interpreted as a due diligence obligation to minimize pollution and to act with appropriate care.1 Indeed, as 
Hassan has noted, Article 194 of the UNCLOS imbues the parties with “wide discretion” in fulfilling their 
obligations by including references to “the best practicable means at their disposal” and “in accordance with 
their capabilities.”2 Burns is of the view that Article 235 of UNCLOS may impose a more stringent standard of 
care as it mandates that States are responsible for fulfilling international obligations that contribute to the 
protection and preservation of the marine environment.3 He further opined that Article 197 of UNCLOS is also 
pertinent, requiring Parties to cooperate through competent international organizations to formulate rules, 
standards, and practices to protect and preserve the marine environment.4  
Even under the UNFCCC, the standard of care was not fixed as it gives wide discretion to Annex I 
parties. One of the core obligation provisions of the UNFCCC uses hortatory rather than mandatory language, 
merely calling on Annex I Parties5 to “aim” to reduce their greenhouse emissions back to 1990 levels by 2000.6 
The foreseeability of harm has increased dramatically in the past year as the scientific understanding of the 
impact of climate change has increased.  
 
3.0. The Way Forward 
There is a long history of looking towards the judicial branches of government, both nationally and 
internationally, to serve as a gap-filler where legislative and regulatory efforts or even diplomatic efforts failed. 
But as stated and discussed earlier litigating loss and damage from climate change impact is replete with a 
number of obstacles.  However, these litanies of likely setbacks inherent in any climate change suit are not 
insurmountable. To this end, a number of ways of circumventing these pitfalls are herein under proffered. 
i). Application of the principle of pacta sunt servanda. The obligations under the UNFCCC are overly open-
ended; precluding a finding of a breach and one of the core obligation provisions of the UNFCCC uses hortatory 
rather than mandatory language, merely calling on Annex I Parties 7  to “aim” to reduce their greenhouse 
emissions back to 1990 levels by 2000.8 However, when obligation of this nature is interpreted in the light of 
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties (VCLT), which requires that treaty obligations must be 
performed in good faith, a cause of action can arise from it.9 This principle of pacta sunt servanda has also been 
recognized as a principle of customary international law. Moreover, while the U.S. has not ratified the Vienna 
Convention, it has recognized the principle of pacta sunt servanda as “perhaps the most important principle of 
international law.”10 Flowing from this, a state party can bring an action against the U.S. for emitting greenhouse 
gas and not reducing its emission in line with the UNFCCC which US ratified but not the Kyoto Protocol. 
ii). Treating climate change reduction obligations as obligation erga omnes. In the Barcelona Traction case 
(Belgium v. Spain);11 the court held that an essential distinction should be drawn between the obligations of a 
state towards the international community as a whole and those owed to other states in the field of diplomatic 
protection. According to the court, the former are of concern to all states and are called obligations erga omnes. 
This obligation erga omnes would be of relevance when global environmental problems arise such as climate 
change. In the enforcement of an erga omnes obligation, Article 41 of the Draft Article on Responsibility of 
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States for Internationally Wrongful Acts provide that all states are to cooperate to bring an end, through lawful 
means, any serious breach by a state of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international 
law and States are not to recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach. Thus, actions leading to 
climate change should not be recognised but denounced by States and States are to cooperate to bring climate 
change to an end. 
iii). Addressing climate change law as customary international law. According to the Statute of the 
International Court of Justice in Article 38 (1) (b), customary international law means evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law. It is determined through general practice of States and what states have accepted as 
law. By this, customary international law is binding on all states. Article 35 of the VCLT provides that an 
obligation arises for a third party state (i.e. a state that is not a party to a treaty) from the provisions of a treaty if 
the parties to the treaty intend the provision to be the means of establishing the obligation and the third state 
expressly accepts the obligation in writing. The exception to this principle here is where the rule expressed in a 
treaty becomes part of customary international law. In such situation, the rule may become binding on the third 
state. The principles of state responsibility, no harm rule, precautionary principle, the principle of good faith and 
host of others are part of customary international law. Thus, addressing climate change through the principle of 
state responsibility can bring violating states under the law whether they are parties to the treaty or not. The 
UNFCCC, Kyoto Protocol, UNCLOS and other Treaties that reflect the moves combating climate change all 
encompass these principles. For example, both the prevention principle and the precautionary principle are laid 
down in Article 3(3) of the UNFCCC. 
Furthermore, with respect to the Kyoto Protocol, due regard is given to Article 30 (4) (b) of the VCLT. 
It provides that where the parties to the later treaty do not include all the parties to the earlier one as between a 
state party to both treaties and a State party to only one of the treaties, the treaty to which both States are parties 
govern their mutual rights and obligations.  Thus, a country that is a state party to the UNFCCC and Kyoto 
Protocol can, for example, bring an action against the U.S. on climate change even though the U.S. has not 
ratified the Kyoto Protocol. Therefore, going by the principles of customary international law reflected in the 
UNFCCC, an action can be brought against any state in default.  
iv). Legal sanction by the United Nations. According to the Preamble to the UNFCCC, signatories declared 
and agreed that “States have in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of 
international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental and 
developmental policies….” This declaration was made in accordance with the United Nations (UN) Charter. 
Article 2(6) of the same UN Charter provides that the UN shall ensure that third party states act in accordance 
with the principles of the United Nations as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and 
security. It is no doubt that climate change poses big threat to international peace and security. To this effect, 
matters of climate change, as enforced under the UNFCCC, should be given adequate attention by the UN for the 
purpose of maintaining international peace and security. 
 
4.0. Conclusion 
It is hoped that litigating loss and damage from climate change impacts may help to create the political pressure 
and third-party guidance required to re-invigorate the international negotiations necessary for climate change 
regulation. This concept of climate change litigation becomes so important because protection of the earth and its 
inhabitants is a collective action for the common good. This notion of the common good also extends to future 
generations. Therefore, if a State is found responsible for committing an unlawful act under international law, it 
is obliged to discontinue the wrongful act, offer guarantees of non-repetition and provide full reparation for the 
consequences of the breach it has committed. Therefore, if anyone wants to cultivate peace, he should protect 
creation. 
 
 
